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WHAT IS THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S ISSUE WITH USPTO 
PATENT REEXAMINATION PROCEEDINGS? 
Kevin Tamm∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 302, any person may request a reexamination of 
an issued patent to ensure that the patent is valid.1  One purpose of a 
broad reexamination statute is unquestioningly “to provide a less costly 
way of removing or restricting patents that should not have been granted 
or that were granted too broadly . . . .”2  Such a procedure is not 
surprising considering that the American patent system has always been 
leery of granting broad patent monopolies.3  However, after In re 
Construction Equipment Co., there remains an unanswered question as 
to how many times a party may try to invalidate a patent.4 
A winding trail of patent litigation began in the late 1990s when 
Construction Equipment Company (CEC) sued Powerscreen for 
infringing CEC’s patent on a portable gravel separator.5  CEC named the 
gravel separator the “Screen-It,” and the device gained popularity while 
providing value to CEC as “a compact but efficient machine . . . pulled 
behind a truck from location to location to sort bulk material consisting 
of soil, dirt, rocks, concrete pieces, stumps and other debris.”6  The 
District Court of Oregon issued an initial injunction against 
Powerscreen, and soon thereafter determined that Powerscreen was in 
fact infringing CEC’s valid patent via its “Titan” screener, which 
performed substantially the same functions as the Screen-It.7  This 
 
             ∗   Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2011) (emphasis added).  The pertinent part of § 302 states: 
Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the Office of any claim 
of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301 of this 
title . . . .  The request must set forth the pertinency and manner of applying cited prior 
art to every claim for which reexamination is requested . . . . 
 2. In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 3. Thomas Jefferson described the patent system as “drawing a line between things which are 
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.”  WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Bergh ed. 1904), available at  http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeff13.txt. 
 4. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 655 F.3d at 1260 (Newman, J., dissenting).  The dissent noted 
Burson v. Carmichael, 731 F.2d 849, 854 (Fed. Cir. 1984), which stated, “There is no support in law for 
repeated bites at the apple.  On the contrary, the law whenever possible reaches for repose.” 
 5. See Constr. Equip. Co. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distrib. Ltd., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1206, at *1207 (D. 
Or. Oct. 20, 1997).  The collective plaintiffs, Construction Equipment Co. and Roger Smith, sued the 
collective defendants Powerscreen International Plc., Powerscreen of America, Inc., Powerscreen of 
Washington, and Powerscreen of Northern California.  See id. 
 6. Id. at *1207; see also In re Constr. Equip. Co., 655 F.3d at 1262 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 7. Constr. Equip. Co., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at *1207, *1211. 
1
Tamm: What is the Federal Circuit’s Issue with USPTO Patent Reexaminati
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1104 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
decision was upheld by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.8  Thus, one would presume, as is 
normally the case, that the issue had been finally decided in an Article 
III court of last resort,9 and CEC had a valid monopoly right granted by 
the patent.10 
However, the challenges to CEC’s U.S. Patent 5,234,564 (‘564 
patent) resumed via a new request for ex parte reexamination in January 
2007.11  Powerscreen, the same defendant in the prior litigation, returned 
with new prior art that it had not presented, and the PTO had not 
considered, during the original litigation in 1997.12  This time around, 
the PTO examiner rejected most of the claims in the patent based on a 
finding of obviousness,13 and the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (BPAI) largely upheld the examiner’s decision twice, in 
both a hearing and rehearing.14  CEC, having run out of administrative 
options, next appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals hoping to 
regain its claims in a patent that was found valid nearly a decade 
earlier.15 
In a 2–1 decision, the Federal Circuit upheld the BPAI’s affirmance 
of the examiner’s findings and rejected CEC’s claims.16  The majority 
issued a brief opinion that ignored constitutional issues not raised by the 
 
 8. Constr. Equip. Co. v. Powerscreen of Am., Inc., 243 F.3d 559 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Powerscreen 
of Am., Inc. v. Constr. Equip. Co., 531 U.S. 1148 (2001). 
 9. After losing in or being refused certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, typically that is the 
end of a litigant’s road in the United States as the decision is binding on all lower courts. 
 10. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 655 F.3d at 1258 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The plan of the 
Constitution places the judicial power in the courts, whose judgments are not thereafter subject to 
revision or rejection.  Neither the legislative nor the executive branch has the authority to revise judicial 
determinations.”). 
 11. See id. at 1255 (majority opinion). 
 12. See id. at 1260 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 13. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) governs obviousness and states: 
(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary 
skill in the art . . . . 
 14. See Ex Parte Constr. Equip. Co., No. 2009-005265, 2009 WL 2807871, at *19–20 (B.P.A.I. 
Aug. 31, 2009).  The BPAI ultimately upheld rejections of claims 1, 2, 5–10, 13, 14, 19, and 20; 
however, on rejecting claims 5 and 6 the BPAI disagreed with one of the combinations of prior art used 
by the examiner.  See id. at *13–15.  Claims 5 and 6, then, were rejected on other obviousness grounds.  
See id. at *20; see also Ex Parte Constr. Equip. Co., No. 2009-005265, 2010 WL 2157846, at *1 
(B.P.A.I. May 28, 2010).  On May 28, 2010 the BPAI, with a panel composed of the exact same 
Administrative Patent Judges as the original panel, rejected CEC’s Request for Rehearing and again 
upheld the examiner’s rejection of the claims.  See id. at *1. 
 15. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1254. 
 16. Id. 
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parties and relied on an earlier case, In re Swanson17, to explain why a 
question that had been adjudicated years before by the Federal Circuit 
could be revisited by an executive agency, such as the USPTO.18  Judge 
Newman issued a scathing dissent criticizing the majority’s opinion for 
ignoring the importance the Constitution places on the final decisions of 
Article III judges and for allowing the relitigation of an issue already 
decided by the court.19 
Part II of this Note first addresses how the winding trail of litigation 
and administrative appeals led to the divided Federal Circuit.  
Afterward, issues raised by the dissent, and largely ignored by the 
majority, will be explored in more detail to evaluate the merit of 
constitutional and issue preclusion arguments in patent cases.  Part III 
discusses possible solutions to resolve the tension between the USPTO, 
district courts, and the Federal Circuit in patent reexamination patent 
proceedings.  The Note concludes that Congress should better define 
what “issue” is being evaluated in reexaminations and must amend 35 
U.S.C. § 302 to better guide judges in procedurally complex patent 
reexamination proceedings. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The events that led to the recent split decision of the Federal Circuit 
began as far back as 1997 when Construction Equipment Company 
(CEC) sued Powerscreen International, PLC and its American 
subsidiaries for infringing its patent on a mobile gravel screening 
device.20  The device was known as the “Screen-It,” and its popularity 
put at stake a substantial amount of money at trial.21  To maintain its 
patent, CEC would need to show the invention fit into the allowed 
statutory subject matter, while being novel and nonobvious.22  Part A 
below discusses the early litigation between Powerscreen and CEC that 
took place primarily in the late 1990s, and Part B discusses the more 
recent dispute between the companies in the USPTO and the Federal 
Circuit that ultimately stripped CEC of its patent rights. 
 
 17. 540 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 18. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1256 n.3. 
 19. See id. at 1257–63 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 20. See Constr. Equip. Co. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distrib. Ltd., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1206, 1207 (D. Or. 
Oct. 20, 1997). 
 21. See id. CEC had recently been assigned the patent to the “Screen-It,” and in 1996 sales of the 
device earned over $5 million.  See id. 
 22. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012).  Sections 101, 102, and 103 describe the requirements for 
statutory subject matter, novelty, and nonobviousness when obtaining a patent. 
3
Tamm: What is the Federal Circuit’s Issue with USPTO Patent Reexaminati
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1106 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
A. The Original Injunction Against Powerscreen 
CEC first sued Powerscreen in the District Court of Oregon in early 
1997, and Powerscreen, as defendant, challenged the validity of CEC’s 
patent using the on-sale and public use bars of 35 U.S.C. § 102.23  The 
court began its analysis by stating, “Patents are presumed valid, and the 
burden of establishing invalidity rests with its proponent.”24  
Throughout the opinion, the court did not find the defendant’s 
arguments persuasive, and the validity of CEC’s patent was upheld 
along with injunction against Powerscreen.25  Further hearings on the 
patent’s validity were held in which Powerscreen attempted to prove 
that the patent should be found obvious and therefore invalid; however, 
CEC ultimately prevailed as the district court found that the Screen-It 
was not an “obvious combination” of prior arts.26 
This all happened prior to KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,27 
when a high bar existed in the Federal Circuit to prove an invention was 
obvious.  Not only did Powerscreen have to show that all of the 
elements of the Screen-It existed in prior art, but that there would be 
some teaching, suggestion, or motivation for a person of ordinary skill 
in the art to combine the prior arts.28  Powerscreen appealed the decision 
of the district court upholding the validity of the patent and the 
injunction to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed without decision.29  
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, and it appeared that Powerscreen 
had exhausted its course of legal options, having lost on the merits, but 
the story was only beginning.30 
 
 23. See Constr. Equip. Co., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1207. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (b) prevent a valid 
patent from issuing when:  
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in 
a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the 
applicant for patent, or (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed 
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more 
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States . . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 24. See Constr. Equip. Co., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1207–08 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012); D.L. Auld 
Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 25. See id. at 1208–11.  The court conducted a highly factual analysis of the development of the 
Screen-It to discover whether its patent was barred because it was in public use or on sale greater than 
one year before filing of the patent.  See id.  The court found, however, Powerscreen did not establish 
either bar by “clear and convincing evidence” and thus the patent needed to be enforced.  See id. at 
1211. 
 26. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Constr. Equip. Co. 
v. Powerscreen Int’l Distrib. Ltd., Civ., No. 96-1574-AS, slip op. at 17–19 (D. Or. June 11, 1998)). 
 27. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Constr. Equip. Co. v. Powerscreen of Am., Inc., 243 F.3d 559 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 30. See Powerscreen of Am., Inc. v. Constr. Equip. Co., 531 U.S. 1148 (2001). 
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B. The “Issue” in Reexamination Proceedings and In re Swanson 
After a nearly ten-year respite, the ‘564 patent was brought into 
controversy once again when Powerscreen requested a new ex parte 
reexamination in January 2007.31  Having previously been found an 
infringer and enjoined, Powerscreen returned with new evidence of prior 
art that it argued would render the ‘564 patent on the Screen-It obvious 
when combined with its previous prior art from the original litigation.32  
The patent examiner, using the new prior art references and prior art 
references from the 1997 litigation, invalidated claims 1, 2, 5–10, 13, 
14, 19, and 20, effectively eliminating the usefulness of CEC’s patent on 
the Screen-It device.33  The BPAI reviewed CEC’s appeal of the 
decision and conducted a factually specific review of the examiner’s 
findings based on the prior art.34  The board relied heavily on Supreme 
Court obviousness jurisprudence from KSR International Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc.35 and Graham v. John Deere Co.36 to uphold the patent examiner’s 
finding that the claimed invention was obvious and the claims therefore 
invalid.37 
After the BPAI’s finding, CEC requested a rehearing by the board—
this was conducted by the same judicial panel as the original appeal.38  
The BPAI briefly reviewed some of its own rejections of the issues on 
appeal, but concluded that none of its decisions were made in err.39  
CEC continued to search for validation of its patent after this rejection 
on rehearing, and proceeded to the Federal Circuit Court for another 
 
 31. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1254. 
 32. See id. at 1269 (Newman, J., dissenting).  The art that the dissent cites from the 1997 
hearings include “Royer Trommel” and “Eriksson.”  See id. at 1260.  In the new 2007 reexamination 
hearing, seven pieces of prior art were relied upon by Powerscreen including “Cheyette,” “Eriksson,” 
“Douglas,” “Mockeln SvH-5 Brochure,” “Mockeln SvH-3 Brochure,” “RSTI Brochure,” and “Royer.”  
See Ex Parte Constr. Equip. Co., No. 2009-005265, 2009 WL 2807871, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 31, 2009). 
 33. See Ex Parte Constr. Equip. Co., 2009 WL 2807871, at *1.  Without valid claims over the 
Screen-It, other companies such as Powerscreen would be free to manufacture the same device and sell 
it under a different name without infringing. 
 34. See id. at *8–19. 
 35. See 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007) (holding no rigid or narrow tests such as the “teaching, 
suggestion, motivation test” should be used to determine obviousness, while acknowledging that it can 
be helpful in such cases for a court to identify a reason that would have motivated a knowledgeable 
person to combine the components). 
 36. 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act added the statutory nonobvious 
subject matter requirement, the determination of which is made after establishing the scope and content 
of prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in 
the pertinent art). 
 37. See Ex Parte Constr. Equip. Co., 2009 WL 2807871, at *19–20. 
 38. See Ex Parte Constr. Equip. Co., No. 2009-005265, 2010 WL 2157846, at *1 (B.P.A.I. May 
28, 2010).  Administrative Patent Judges Linda E. Horner, Scott R. Boalick, and Daniel S. Song heard 
both the original appeal to the examiner’s decision and the rehearing.  See id. 
 39. See id. at *4. 
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opportunity at overturning the patent examiner’s finding of 
obviousness.40 
In the Federal Circuit, CEC once again lost its argument, and the 
majority, in a brief opinion, upheld the original decision of the patent 
examiner.41  The majority agreed with the BPAI that the combined new 
and old references offered by Powerscreen read on every limitation of 
the claims in the patent, that one of ordinary skill in the art could 
combine the references to make and use the Screen-It, and that there 
would be a reason for a person of ordinary skill in the art to do so.42  
The court dismissed CEC’s contentions and noted “the basic concepts of 
sifting and sorting material are not new.  Neither are the concepts of 
carrying material via conveyors, or of positioning the sorting machine 
on a trailer, as the ‘564 patent does.”43  Notably, the majority did not 
address secondary factors that weigh toward a finding of 
nonobviousness, such as commercial success, long-felt but unsolved 
needs, and failure of others.44 
Additionally, the majority responded to Judge Newman’s lengthy 
dissent via a footnote and did not address many of the complex issues 
raised.45  First, the court would not address issues that the suit at bar 
should have been invalid on constitutional grounds or grounds of issue 
preclusion because these issues were not raised nor argued by either 
party.46  The court stated, “appellate courts . . . have a well-established 
practice of declining to take up arguments not timely made by the 
parties.”47  Further, the court touched on the idea of issue preclusion and 
relied on In re Swanson48 to discount the dissent’s argument.49  The 
majority insinuated here via In re Swanson that just because 
Powerscreen had failed in the earlier 1997 litigation to invalidate CEC’s 
patent, this did not mean that CEC’s patent was valid per se.50  Instead, 
Powerscreen had merely failed to carry its burden in that litigation to 
 
 40. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 41. Id. at 1254. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. at 1256. 
 44. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); see also, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. 
Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538–39 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Indeed, evidence of secondary 
considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record . . . .  It is to be 
considered as part of all the evidence, not just when the decisionmaker remains in doubt after reviewing 
the art.”). 
 45. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1256 n.3. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976); Boggs v. West, 188 F.3d 1335, 
1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 48. 540 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 49. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1256 n.3. 
 50. See id. 
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prove the patent invalid by clear and convincing evidence, and thus, 
when the patent examiner declared the patent invalid, it did not 
contradict the earlier ruling of the Federal Circuit.51  The majority did 
not address specifically whether obviousness was the issue that was 
litigated before, or if it could be litigated again, nor whether the new 
prior art references raised by Powerscreen were new issues or whether 
they were new evidence that should have been raised in the prior 
litigation.52 
Finally, the majority refused to accept what it saw as a “dramatic 
expansion of the concept of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel.”53  
The majority believed the dissent to be implying that if a patent was 
found to be not invalid in one proceeding against a party, then other 
parties should also be precluded from bringing invalidity challenges, and 
this was too broad a holding for the majority to stomach.54 
Judge Newman’s lengthy dissent provided a much different 
perspective on the case at bar than the majority’s short approval of the 
administrative agency’s findings.55 
C. The Dissent and the Specter of Constitutional Issues in Patent Law 
The dissent’s opinion began by questioning whether a final decision 
in an Article III court has any value at commerce or in law “[or whether 
it is] an inconsequential detour along the administrative path to a 
contrary result?”56  Judge Newman’s concern arose from the fact that 
the USPTO, an administrative agency under the executive branch of 
government, came to a contrary decision on the validity of CEC’s patent 
nearly ten years after litigation in which Powerscreen had lost its 
challenge against CEC in an Article III court.57  
The first point made by the dissent was that, based on Article III, 
Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, the current litigation should never 
have been allowed.58  Article III, the dissent argued, places the judicial 
power in the courts of the United States, here the Federal Circuit.59  
Additionally, the decision of those courts is not subject to review by the 
 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 1257–63 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 1257. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. at 1257–58.  Article III, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution states, “The judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 59. In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1258 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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executive branch, such as the USPTO—an administrative agency under 
that branch.60  The dissent also rebutted the majority’s stance that such 
arguments should not be heard because the parties did not raise them in 
the lower tribunals.61  In Judge Newman’s opinion, issues of such 
importance cannot be waived by the parties and must be raised by 
justices sua sponte.62  The dissent found that “the nation’s fundamental 
law is not waivable.  The Court has reiterated that ‘[w]hen these Article 
III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be 
dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the 
parties cannot be expected to protect.’”63  Ultimately, because in the 
case there was a “final disposition of the issue of [patent] validity in 
Article III courts,” the dissent believed it was crucial to uphold the 
judgment and “safeguard[] the role of the Judicial Branch . . . by barring 
congressional attempts to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III 
tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating constitutional courts . . . .”64 
The next issue the dissent addressed was issue preclusion.65  Again, 
Judge Newman found that it was inconsequential that such issues were 
not raised by the parties because “preclusion principles serve the 
powerful public and private interests of finality in judicial proceedings 
and the avoidance of inconsistent results.”66  Because Powerscreen had 
its day in court to litigate the issue of obviousness when it was sued by 
CEC in 1997, it was nonsensical for Powerscreen to relitigate the same 
issue years later against the same party.67  The dissent found the 
majority’s reliance on In re Swanson misplaced because that case 
focused on varying burdens of proof in the courts and the administrative 
agencies, which was a run-around for allowing administrative agencies 
to override judicial rulings.68  Further, Judge Newman did not agree that 
the collateral estoppel would be “non-mutual,” because while 
Powerscreen was the defendant in the 1997 litigation, and the party 
requesting reexamination against CEC in the current litigation, 
Powerscreen was still raising the same obviousness issue against the 
same party, CEC.69  Finally, Judge Newman pointed out that uncertainty 
in the patent system, a large impetus for the recent America Invents 
 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 1257. 
 63. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)). 
 64. Id. at 1258 (internal quotes omitted). 
 65. Id. at 1258–61. 
 66. Id. at 1259 (citing Clements v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 330 (9th Cir. 
1995)). 
 67. See id. at 1258–61. 
 68. Id. at 1261. 
 69. Id. 
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Act,70 would cause problems in terms of commercial investment, 
property rights, and the patent incentive.71 
The dissent concluded by discussing the reexamination statue itself 
and the merits of the obviousness finding.72  The judge noted that the 
whole purpose behind reexamination is to help parties avoid litigation, 
reduce litigation costs, and allow a second look at patents that may have 
been granted too broadly or in error.73  The dissenting judge found that 
after an Article III court makes a final decision regarding a patent, 
interested persons should be able to rely on the decision and not believe 
that further reexamination proceedings could override a final judicial 
decision.74  Judge Newman also disagreed with the majority in terms of 
the merits of the obviousness analysis and accused them of engaging in 
judicial hindsight analysis, which is prohibited when analyzing a patent 
for obviousness.75  The dissent acknowledged that the majority had 
found the individual claim elements of the Screen-It in separate prior art 
references, but engaged in hindsight because it did not provide a 
“rational underpinning” to show why a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would combine the references in such a way.76  Further, the dissent 
noted the commercial success of the Screen-It, a secondary factor that 
can be used to find nonobviousness, and explained how the majority 
ignored this point.77 
The trail of litigation that led to the most recent CEC case in the 
Federal Circuit consumed the time, energy, and resources of 
Powerscreen, CEC, the USPTO, attorneys, and judges for over fourteen 
years.  Continuous patent litigation shows a need for change, especially 
 
 70. Id.; COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Background on H.R. 1249, the America Invents Act, in 
AMERICA INVENTS ACT OF 2011, available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/issues_patentreformact2011.html (“We cannot expect America’s 
innovators and job creators to keep pace with the global marketplace with the patent system of the past.  
We need a system that ensures patent certainty, approves good patents quickly and weeds out bad 
patents effectively.”) (emphasis added). 
 71. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1261 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 1262–63. 
 73. See id. at 1262 (citing Patent Reexamination: Hearing on S. 1679 Before the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 15–16 (1979) (statement of Comm’r Sidney Diamond) (“Reexamination 
would eliminate or simplify a significant amount of patent litigation. In some cases, the PTO would 
conclude as a result of reexamination that a patent should not have issued.  A certain amount of 
litigation over validity and infringement thus would be completely avoided.”)); 126 CONG. REC. 30364 
(1980) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“Reexamination would allow patent holders and challengers to avoid 
the present costs and delays of patent litigation . . . Patent reexamination will also reduce the burden on 
our overworked courts by drawing on the expertise of the Patent and Trademark Office.”). 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. at 1262–63. 
 76. See id. Even after KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), a reason or 
rational underpinning must exist for a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine references and find 
an invention obvious. 
 77. In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1263 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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since a patent only lasts twenty years from its date of filing.  The 
following discussion addresses the issues raised by Judge Newman and 
possible ways to avoid such a protracted and indecisive series of ex 
parte appeals.  
III. DISCUSSION 
The issues raised by the dissent in In re Construction Equipment Co. 
present important questions concerning judicial deference to the patent 
office and the role of the Constitution in patent law.  While the 
majority’s opinion is brief, it relies on In re Swanson, which provides a 
detailed view into the Federal Circuit’s current jurisprudence on 
reexamination and the court’s parallel role with the USPTO.  The 
dissent questioned many of the premises on which In re Swanson relied, 
as well as why the majority seemed to ignore issues that affect all other 
courts in relation to the constitutional structure.  This Part analyzes the 
complex legal analysis of both sides and, perhaps more importantly, the 
effects that such views and legal wrangling have on the rights of the 
parties involved, especially the patent holders.  At the end of the day, the 
intricate legal arguments affect the abilities of companies to operate and 
profit in the economy, and with seemingly logical arguments on both 
sides of the debate, the rights of patent holders should take center stage. 
A. How should the Constitution fit Into Patent Law Reexamination? 
The majority’s brief opinion in In re Construction Equipment Co. 
largely dismissed the dissent’s constitutional concerns in a footnote, 
which explained that because neither of the parties in the litigation 
below had raised, briefed, nor argued constitutional concerns, the court 
would not address them.78  This result is not surprising in light of In re 
Swanson, decided only three years earlier on a similar issue, where the 
Federal Circuit stated that a vague statue “should be interpreted to avoid 
raising ‘grave and doubtful constitutional questions . . . .’”79  
Constitutional issues concerning grave and doubtful questions, however, 
may be the most important issues to raise because they may threaten the 
most substantive rights.80 
The dissent in In re Construction Equipment Co. did not hesitate to 
raise the constitutional issues because “‘[w]hen these Article III 
 
 78. See id. at 1256 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 79. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Gonzalez v. United States, 
553 U.S. 242, 251 (2008)). 
 80. The practical result of the In re Construction Equipment Co. litigation is that CEC lost its 
patent claims and therefore its legal monopoly for selling the Screen-It and profiting from it. 
10
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss3/9
2013] COMMENT—USPTO PATENT REEXAMINATION 1113 
limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be 
dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the 
parties cannot be expected to protect.’”81  Essentially, the dissent 
emphasized that CEC had litigated what it likely viewed as the same 
issue roughly ten years earlier and likely assumed that it need not raise 
constitutional issues on appeal in order to re-defend its right to a patent, 
which the Federal Circuit had originally affirmed.82  The dissent noted 
at length the importance of separation of powers and the idea that 
Congress could not have intended, even by expanding the reexamination 
statute in 2002, to weaken the decisions of Article III judges.83  Justice 
Newman stated bluntly, “The plan of the Constitution places the judicial 
power in the courts, whose judgments are not thereafter subject to 
revision or rejection.  Neither the legislative nor the executive branch 
has the authority to revise judicial determinations.”84  
The dissent’s apt legal argument can be easily translated into practical 
wisdom starting with the idea that “[r]espect for judicial finality, when 
there has been a final decision, does not ‘upset . . . the entire 
reexamination proceeding.’”85  Primarily this is so because Powerscreen 
and the USPTO had their chance at reexamination years earlier on the 
issue of obviousness.  Neither Powerscreen nor the USPTO were 
deprived of their rights.  However, from the perspective of CEC, having 
defeated its opponent Powerscreen in court years earlier, the company 
likely believed it had a right to profit from the Screen-It.  One can 
imagine a scenario in which a company invests in manufacturing or 
factories solely because it has the limited right to sell a profitable 
product.  Here, though, when rights have been adjudicated by judicial 
and executive agencies in parallel, it becomes difficult for companies to 
understand what rights they can exercise.  The dissent noted, “The issue 
here arises because the judicial function has already been performed, 
and warrants the finality of the Judicial Power.”86  This “finality” is 
what is intended in the constitutional scheme to allow citizens and 
companies to operate knowing their rights.87 
 
 81. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1257 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)). 
 82. See Constr. Equip. Co. v. Powerscreen of Am., Inc., 243 F.3d 559 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 83. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1257–58 (Newman, J., dissenting).  The expansion 
of the reexamination statute is discussed further infra at Part III(B). 
 84. Id. at 1258. 
 85. Id. (quoting the majority opinion at 1256 n.3). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Program, 20 F.3d 289, 
294 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Wright, Miller & Cooper) (“The law of collateral estoppel is intended to 
protect the parties from the burden of relitigating the same issue following a final judgment and to 
promote judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.”); see also Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. 
Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
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The Federal Circuit in In re Swanson earlier addressed the issue 
raised by the dissent in In re Construction Equipment Co., where the 
patent holder, Surmodics, argued that “allowing an executive agency to 
find patent claims invalid after an Article III court has upheld their 
validity violates the constitutionally mandated separation of powers, and 
therefore must be avoided.”88  The Swanson court’s opinion explained 
that when an Article III court rules that a patent is valid against an 
infringer, it is in actuality ruling only that the alleged infringer failed to 
prove that the patent was invalid.89  Thus, the court found that even if 
the patent office later finds the patent to be invalid, such a finding “does 
not disturb [the Federal Circuit’s] earlier holding.”90 
While this reasoning addressed the technical legal issue of the 
USPTO91 disturbing an Article III court’s ruling, it does nothing to help 
the rights of the litigants in the case.92  Patent rights are intended to 
grant commercial investment and property rights.93  Imagine a 
homeowner that goes to court to defend a title in ownership against 
another who claims to also hold title to the house, such that the 
homeowner’s right to use may not be exclusive.  In the real property 
context, it would be absurd to believe that the court would not finally 
adjudicate the issue one way or the other, and at the end of the day one 
party or the other would have legitimate title and exclusive ownership of 
the house.  In a typical property case, the party questioning the title of 
the owner, if it failed to prove the title invalid in court, could not return 
years later and try again.  Further, if the party questioning title lost, the 
court’s ruling in favor of the title-holder would guarantee that holder the 
exclusive right to use of the house.  However, what the majority opinion 
in In re Construction Equipment Co. ruled was essentially that just 
because CEC won at trial as against Powerscreen, it did not vindicate its 
own property rights.  Similarly, it would be like the homeowner who 
won in a title action against a challenger to the home’s title, but after 
 
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (2d ed. 1981)) (describing that the doctrine of issue 
preclusion bars relitigation of issues previously decided “on principles of finality and repose”); see also 
United States v. Nez Perce Cnty., 553 F. Supp. 187, 189–90 (D. Idaho Dec. 7, 1982) (1918 decree 
establishing title to land and enjoining all future tax assessments was held binding against a county that 
attempted to defy the decree some sixty years later). 
 88. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
 89. See id. at 1379. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Again, the USPTO is an executive agency under the executive branch of government. 
 92. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1258 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Chi. & S. 
Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 114 (1948) (“Judgments, within the powers vested 
in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution, may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused 
faith and credit by another Department of Government.”)). 
 93. Id. at 1261. 
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prevailing did not actually own the home.94  The title to the house would 
offer no protection, as its validity could be challenged time and again 
years down the road. 
The dissent noted the detrimental effect such a lack of finality can 
have on patent holders, and the legal maneuverings of the majority, also 
present in In re Swanson, do little to reinforce industry’s trust of the 
patent system.  The founders intended by granting a limited monopoly 
(currently twenty years)95 to patent holders, that the patent holders in 
exchange would grant their knowledge surrounding the invention to the 
public through the patent instrument.  Typically, trade secrets are 
viewed as offering weaker protections against others than a patent; 
however, the decision in In re Construction Equipment Co. should make 
industry and inventors reconsider that proposition.96  Inventions such as 
the Screen-It will place CEC and other companies in a difficult position.  
If patent protection is not available or sufficient, trade secrets are 
unlikely to protect such a product due to the ease of reverse engineering 
a machine.  However, other companies with inventions that are not so 
easily reverse engineered will turn to trade secrets, and the public 
domain will be worse off for the lack of disclosure and knowledge. 
The lofty constitutional arguments on both sides of the debate were 
strong.  The majority relied largely on In re Swanson where the court 
argued: 
[A] challenger who attacks the validity of patent claims must overcome 
the presumption of validity with clear and convincing evidence that the 
patent is invalid . . . courts do not find patents valid, only that the patent 
challenger did not carry the burden of establishing invalidity in the 
particular case before the court.97 
Thus, the majority essentially determined that a patent cannot be found 
per se valid by a court.  However, as the dissent in In re Construction 
Equipment Co. noted, Article III of the Constitution was meant to 
protect against an accumulation of power in one branch of government 
 
 94. See generally Adam Mossoff, Patents as Property: Conceptualizing the Exclusive Right(s) in 
Patent Law (Working Paper No. 08-49, 2008), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/pubs/papers/08-49. 
 95. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). 
 96. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S. 470, 489–90 (1974) (“Trade secret law provides 
far weaker protection in many respects than the patent law.  While trade secret law does not forbid the 
discovery of the trade secret by fair and honest means, e.g., independent creation or reverse engineering, 
patent law operates ‘against the world,’ forbidding any use of the invention for whatever purpose for a 
significant length of time.  The holder of a trade secret also takes a substantial risk that the secret will be 
passed on to his competitors, by theft or by breach of a confidential relationship, in a manner not easily 
susceptible of discovery or proof.  Where patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions 
relatively as a sieve.  The possibility that an inventor who believes his invention meets the standards of 
patentability will sit back, rely on trade secret law, and after one year of use forfeit any right to patent 
protection, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), is remote indeed.”) (citations omitted). 
 97. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotes omitted). 
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that could override the judicial branch and question the final 
adjudications of parties’ rights in the courts.98  Regardless which side is 
more correct or persuasive, it should be remembered that real people and 
real companies are affected by these decisions.  The dissent noted the 
novelty and usefulness of the Screen-It brought “commercial 
value . . . imitators, and litigation.”99 
Judicial finality weighs in favor of the parties’ interests and should 
have decided the question here.  Notably, judicial finality would not 
have weighed against either party in In re Construction Equipment Co.  
For instance, while the finality would have weighed in favor of CEC by 
upholding its patent for twenty years, in the future when CEC develops 
new technologies that it decides to keep as trade secrets, Powerscreen 
may not be able to access them or reverse engineer the new technology 
easily.  The lack of knowledge will make the whole market for 
technology worse off.100  Further, if companies interpret trade secrets as 
providing less protection while patents lead to endless litigation, 
development in new technology may slow overall.  However, the issue 
may not need to be resolved on lofty constitutional issues, because the 
court wrangled with procedural difficulties as well. 
B. Can Res Judicata and Issue Preclusion Resolve the “Issue”? 
Beyond the constitutional issues raised by the dissent in In re 
Construction Equipment Co. were fundamental issues of claim and issue 
preclusion.101  Once again, the brief majority opinion acknowledged 
these arguments only in a footnote, discounting them wholly and 
referring once again to In re Swanson.  The dissent confronted the 
arguments from In re Swanson and further raised other issues that throw 
into question the purpose and goals of the reexamination statute.102  The 
dissent found that if the constitutional arguments were not enough to 
stop the USPTO from overturning an Article III court’s judgment 
regarding CEC’s valid patent, res judicata and issue preclusion should 
prevent reopening a closed issue.103 
 
 98. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 1263 n.2. 
 100. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“[T]he 
ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain 
through disclosure.”). 
 101. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1258–59 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 102. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–04 (2012). 
 103. Once again, the dissent ignored the majority’s concern that res judicata and issue preclusion 
were not raised by the parties in lower courts because it is too important to ignore.  See In re Constr. 
Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1259 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“Waiver is inapplicable against issues of res 
judicata and issue preclusion, for preclusion principles serve the powerful public and private interests of 
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In Justice Newman’s opinion, Powerscreen had no legitimate right to 
relitigate an issue which it had litigated years before—obviousness—
and lost.104  In the original litigation in the District Court of Oregon, 
Powerscreen had attacked the validity of CEC’s patent on grounds of 
obviousness, and after arguing its case with its scientific references, it 
did not convince the court that the invention would have been obvious at 
the time of invention to one of ordinary skill in the art.105  Powerscreen 
returned seven years later and requested ex parte reexamination of 
CEC’s patent based on grounds of obviousness with scientific references 
it had used in the original litigation in district court and new, additional 
references.106  The dissent’s concern was well-founded, because beyond 
the constitutional concern of the USPTO arguably overriding a decision 
of an Article III court, discussed supra, the USPTO allowed 
Powerscreen, a party that should be bound by its earlier loss, to 
essentially have another shot at unseating CEC’s rights.107 
The dissent noted briefly that “finality is particularly compelling in 
the context of commercial investment and property rights,” but this is an 
understatement.  CEC went through the cost and difficulty involved in 
obtaining a patent, but it also fought diligently against Powerscreen in 
civil litigation to defend the validity of its patent.  At the end of that long 
road, CEC had won and likely desired to profit not only from the 
invention but its work defending it.  From a company’s point of view, 
having won in court after having a patent challenged on obviousness, 
business decisions would certainly be made surrounding such a decision.  
An owner might think to increase production, or even increase 
production capabilities, since the company has been granted a legal 
monopoly on a market for twenty years from the filing date of the 
 
finality in judicial proceedings and the avoidance of inconsistent results.”) (citing Clements v. Airport 
Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 69 F.3d 321, 330 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 104. Id.  The dissent quoted San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 336 n.16 
(2005) (“Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their 
privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.  Under collateral 
estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may 
preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first 
case.”). 
 105. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1258–59 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 1260. The dissent noted, “‘[t]he underlying rationale of the doctrine of issue 
preclusion is that a party who has litigated an issue and lost should be bound by that decision and cannot 
demand that the issue be decided over again.’” (citing In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 
1994).  There are three elements of issue preclusion that are commonly quoted: (1) there must have been 
a prior litigation in which the identical issue was brought before the court; (2) the issue must have been 
actually litigated in the first judicial proceeding, and the party against whom collateral estoppel is being 
asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first judicial proceeding; and 
(3) the issue must necessarily have been decided and rendered as a necessary part of the court’s final 
judgment.  See generally Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979) (discussing issue preclusion)).  
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patent. 
However, after In re Construction Equipment Co., this can no longer 
be the case.  Not only does a company now need to worry about 
challenges from other companies and alleged infringers to patent 
validity (as companies needed to prior to In re Construction Equipment 
Co.); companies must be concerned about repeated challenges in the 
USPTO by past adversarial litigants.  As discussed supra, if a patent 
brings about this much-prolonged litigation for a company, companies 
may be less likely to invest in new technologies, and companies will 
certainly be less likely to use the patent incentive.  Facially, a business 
manager would find that keeping a new technology a secret would be 
easier, less costly, and less risky than disclosing the technology via a 
patent and fighting repeated battles in the courts for years to come, 
possibly against the same litigants. 
As noted, the majority opinion relied almost wholly on In re Swanson 
to address the concerns raised by the dissent.108  Swanson provided a 
detailed analysis of the reexamination statute, the recent amendment to 
§ 303(a), and the purpose behind the procedure.  Generally, In re 
Swanson explained that reexaminations are supposed to check the 
quality of patents and ensure that they were not issued in err by 
government agents.109  The dissent from In re Construction Equipment 
Co. additionally stated that the purpose of reexamination is “to provide a 
less costly way of removing or restricting patents that should not have 
been granted or that were granted too broadly . . . . ”110  The Swanson 
 
 108. In addition to referring to In re Swanson, the majority commented puzzlingly in a footnote 
that “the dissent’s suggestion that a finding that a patent is not invalid in one proceeding against one 
party would bar any other validity challenge would be a dramatic expansion of the concept of non-
mutual offensive collateral estoppel.”  See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1256 n.3 (majority 
opinion).  The dissent, however, rebutted, “The question here is not of non-mutuality, for this 
reexamination was initiated by . . .  the same party that was defendant in the district court and Federal 
Circuit.  The question is whether the administrative agency is bound by prior final adjudication of the 
same issue—a question that has been definitively answered by the Supreme Court.” Id. at 1261 
(Newman, J., dissenting).  The majority’s opinion is questionable because non-mutuality is typically 
viewed as issue preclusion between different parties, but CEC and Powerscreen were the parties in the 
original civil litigation.  And, while Powerscreen was not technically a “party” to the ex parte 
reexamination, Powerscreen did initiate the proceeding.  The dissent also did not suggest other parties 
could not raise a reexamination. 
 109. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Congress intended 
reexaminations to provide an important ‘quality check’ on patents that would allow the government to 
remove defective and erroneously granted patents.”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 107-120 (2002)). 
 110. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1261 (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
The dissent cited Patent Reexamination: Hearing on S. 1679 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
96th Cong. 15–16 (1979) (statement of Comm’r Sidney Diamond) (“Reexamination would eliminate or 
simplify a significant amount of patent litigation.  In some cases, the PTO would conclude as a result of 
reexamination that a patent should not have issued.  A certain amount of litigation over validity and 
infringement thus would be completely avoided.”). 
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court further analyzed the 2002 amendment to § 303(a)111 and its 
relation to an earlier Federal Circuit case, In re Portola Packaging Inc., 
which narrowed reexamination.112 
Congress rebuffed Portola Packaging and added a new sentence to 
§ 303(a) intended to broaden what the PTO could consider in 
reexamination.113  The Swanson court explained that this amendment 
was intended to broaden the documents that the USPTO could use 
during reexaminations, and simply because a document had been cited 
in a prior reexamination, this did not mean that it could not be used if 
there was a “substantial new question of patentability.”114  The Swanson 
court analyzed the statutory language, legislative history, and the 
purposes behind reexamination and concluded “that Congress did not 
intend a prior court judgment upholding the validity of a claim to 
prevent the PTO from finding a substantial new question of validity 
regarding an issue that has never been considered by the PTO.”115  
Further, the court noted that in civil litigation, alleged infringers must 
prove a patent invalid by clear and convincing evidence as compared to 
the USPTO, where the standard of proof is only a preponderance.116 
Thus, for the preceding reasons, the court found that prior civil litigation 
did not preclude a “substantial new question of patentability” from 
arising in part from documents that were considered in the prior 
litigation.117  The dissent in In re Construction Equipment Co. rebutted 
this argument noting, “a lower standard of proof in an administrative 
 
 111. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The 2002 Amendments were 
intended to undo the consequences of Portola Packaging. 
 112. See generally In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  In Portola 
Packaging, the court interpreted § 303(a), which requires a “substantial new question of patentability 
affecting any claim of the patent concerned . . . .” to mean that reexamination could not be based on 
“prior art previously considered by the PTO in relation to the same or broader claims.”  See also In re 
Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1375 (internal quotes omitted). 
 113. In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1375.  The new sentence added to § 303(a) states, “The existence 
of a substantial new question of patentability is not precluded by the fact that a patent or printed 
publication was previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office.”  See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 303(a) (2012). 
 114. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1375–76. 
 115. Id. at 1376–78.  The statute does not define what constitutes a “substantial new question of 
patentability.”  However, the language added in the amended statute specifically discusses references 
“previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office,” 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2002), but does 
not address any prior citation or consideration by courts.  Similarly, the legislative history for both the 
original and amended reexamination statute suggest that Congress was concerned only with the 
consideration of issues in prior PTO examinations, not prior civil litigation.  The legislative history of 
the 2002 amendment similarly states that the test for a substantial new question of patentability should 
focus on what “the examiner” considered.  H.R. REP. NO. 107-120, at 3 (2001).  Not once in the 
legislative history did Congress refer to references or issues addressed in prior civil litigation. 
 116. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1377–78. 
 117. See id. at 1378. 
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agency cannot override the finality of judicial adjudication.”118 
Once again, the legal arguments on both sides of the debate are valid; 
however, it is the duty of judges to look past the technicalities in such 
close and ambiguous cases and respect the rights of the parties that are 
at stake.  The Swanson court focused on Congress’s intent to broaden 
the reach of the patent reexamination statute which it certainly did 
intend to do; however, that court also noted, “[n]ot once in the 
legislative history did Congress refer to references or issues addressed in 
prior civil litigation.”119  Further, the dissent from In re Construction 
Equipment Co. noted, “The reexamination statutes do not purport to 
grant to the PTO the authority to ignore final judgments.  Such an 
adjudicatory structure would not have been contemplated by the 
Congress . . . .”120  Therefore, without an explicit congressional 
statement that prior rights granted to a patent holder by an Article III 
court are intended to be taken away by an executive agency such as the 
PTO, some change is needed. 
One of the fundamental problems with the arguments on both sides is 
that neither side has acknowledged that in the phrase “substantial new 
question of patentability,” the term “new question,” i.e. issue, is not 
defined.  To the dissent in In re Construction Equip. Co., the issue is 
clearly obviousness generally.121  Essentially, the dissent is saying that 
because obviousness was litigated years before, Powerscreen could not 
raise a “substantial new question of patentability” based on obviousness.  
The dissent did not view the new references as the new question; the 
question was only obviousness.  This makes sense for multiple reasons.  
First, in line with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party can only 
seek relief from a judgment or order by entering new evidence if the 
evidence is of the type that “with reasonable diligence, could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).”122  
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus keep parties diligent by 
giving only one trial and requiring the parties to diligently seek out all of 
the evidence relevant to a case the first time in court. 
New references in obviousness analyses are practically and 
realistically closer to new “evidence” than “substantial new questions of 
patentability,” because references are essentially documents.  
References are typically documents from science or industry, and such 
documents when used in civil or criminal court are typically entered as 
 
 118. In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d 1254, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 119. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1377. 
 120. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1259 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 121. In discussing res judicata and issue preclusion, the dissent in In re Constr. Equip. Co. stated, 
“Powerscreen could not have relitigated the question of obviousness in any court.”  Id. 
 122. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2). 
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“evidence” and not “issues.”123  Further, because obviousness analyses 
are conducted “at the time the invention was made . . . to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art,” all references must exist at or before the 
time of the invention.124  Thus, in the original litigation between CEC 
and Powerscreen, the additional documents that Powerscreen put forth 
years later to the USPTO would have been available if Powerscreen 
searched more diligently because they must have existed at the time of 
the invention.125  The patent system, like the civil courts via the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, should reward diligent parties and not give 
parties the opportunity to drag out such matters for decades. 
Another reason that the “issue” or “substantial new question” should 
be viewed as obviousness alone and not new references is that the longer 
litigation or reexamination proceedings go on, the more likely judges 
and the USPTO will engage in “hindsight combination.”126  The dissent 
in In re Construction Equip. Co. described this briefly and accused the 
majority of engaging in hindsight combination by taking disparate 
elements of the new references and old references to “piece together” 
the invention without a “rational underpinning” for combining the 
references.127  It took Powerscreen nearly ten years to gather these 
documents and construct its arguments, so was the Screen-It really all 
that “obvious?” 
When an invention is in use in the public domain, the more common 
it will become, either to the industries or consumers that use the 
invention.  As time goes on, the more likely any observer would engage 
in a hindsight-style obviousness analysis, including judges.  For 
instance, most members of the public would certainly now call Post-it 
Notes obvious.  However, at the time of the invention, no similar 
invention existed, and Post-it Notes were in fact patented.128  And 
incorrectly, the majority stated in its brief opinion, “[a]s CEC itself 
admits, the basic concepts of sifting and sorting material are not new.  
Neither are the concepts of carrying material via conveyors . . . .”129 
First, the majority’s comment misconstrues the issues because in an 
obviousness analysis, it is not relevant whether the aforementioned 
concepts are new.130  Second, as time goes on, any litigant will be able 
 
 123. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).  This exception to hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence of 
commonly called the “business records exception” and the documents that would be used as new 
references in prior art would be comparable to business records. 
 124. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1262 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 127. See id. at 1262–63 (internal quotes omitted). 
 128. See U.S. Patent No. 5,194,299 (filed Dec. 31, 1986). 
 129. See In re Constr. Equip. Co., 665 F.3d at 1256. 
 130. In the patent statutes 35 U.S.C. § 102 discusses novelty, and this was not an issue in the case.  
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to find more distantly related references that can be combined to 
contribute to a finding of obviousness.  The problem is that inventions 
eventually become more common and the likeliness of hindsight 
increases.  Then, weaker and weaker references can contribute to a 
finding of obviousness.  When Powerscreen returned with five new 
references to the USPTO for reexamination, some of these were foreign 
references and likely were not found in time to be used in the original 
litigation.131  This not only shows a possible lack of diligence on the part 
of Powerscreen, which should not be rewarded by allowing a second 
chance in the USPTO.  Also, had these references been used in the 
original litigation years earlier with a lower chance of hindsight 
construction, these references may not have been relevant enough for a 
finding of obviousness.  Further, in the courts, a defendant must prove a 
patent invalid by clear and convincing evidence whereas in the USPTO, 
a patent need only be found obvious by a preponderance of the 
evidence.132  If Powerscreen had been diligent and found such 
references years earlier for the original litigation when the chance of 
hindsight analysis was lower and the burden of proof higher in the 
Article III court, the Screen-It may not have been found obvious at all. 
The problems discussed herein should be addressed by Congress as 
the technical legal arguments by the court are strong on both sides and 
ignore almost wholly the rights of and costs to the parties involved in 
civil litigation and reexamination proceedings.  One simple solution 
could be a statement by Congress that issues related to patentability in 
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, and 103, such as utility, novelty, and 
obviousness, previously litigated in the courts of the United States are 
not subject to review by the USPTO at the request of a party from prior 
litigation.  Another possible solution might be a statute of limitations on 
USPTO ex parte reexamination of an issue after civil litigation. 
The dissent in In re Construction Equip. Co. likely would not seem as 
irritated by the decision of the USPTO if it had not happened nearly a 
decade after the original litigation between Powerscreen and CEC.  If 
there were a one-year statute of limitation on the same party raising the 
same issue in the USPTO that it litigated before in an Article III court, 
this would put the patentee on notice that it may need to further defend 
its patent in an agency proceeding.  Further, this would keep parties 
diligent while avoiding the question as to whether new references should 
be viewed as new issues or new evidence.  
In In re Construction Equipment Co., it becomes questionable how a 
 
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 131. See Ex Parte Constr. Equip. Co., No. 2009-005265, 2009 WL 2807871, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 
31, 2009). 
 132. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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company like CEC can make business decisions when it can never be 
secure in what rights it possesses.  It is true that Congress has an interest 
in ensuring patents are properly issued;133 however, there is also an 
interest in allowing patent holders to feel secure in their rights.  If they 
are not, then the patent incentive is severely decreased, and inventors 
and business owners could simply turn to trade secrets.  It is 
questionable whether a litigant deserves another opportunity to prove a 
patent invalid in the USPTO at a lower burden of proof after failing in 
the courts, especially in light of the constitutional concerns discussed 
supra in Part III(A).  However, if Congress feels such an opportunity is 
deserved and constitutional, a statute of limitations would at least 
provide the parties with knowledge of their rights and burdens. 
IV. THE CONTINUING LEGAL BATTLE 
Recently, the Federal Circuit issued a similar opinion and dissent in 
In re Baxter Intern, Inc.,134 and it subsequently denied a rehearing en 
banc.135  The case surrounded U.S. Patent 5,247,434 for a hemodialysis 
machine, which a prior Federal Circuit decision had rendered not 
invalid.136  However, upon reexamination at the USPTO, claims 26–31 
of the patent were found to be obvious in light of the prior art.137  The 
majority opinion authored by Judge Lourie once again found no issue 
with the different decisions in the federal court and in the USPTO.138  
Judge Lourie focused on the varying standards of proof for a challenger 
to prove a patent invalid (clear and convincing in the courts and a 
preponderance in the USPTO), and found that it should be expected  that 
the the judicial and executive bodies could render different decisions 
even when presented with the same evidence.139 
On the other hand, in both the original opinion and the denial for 
rehearing en banc, Judge Newman issued scathing dissents focused on 
the same issues discussed supra.140  The judge discussed why such 
different decisions should not be allowed based on finality of judicial 
 
 133. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d at 1378 (“To hold otherwise would allow a civil litigant’s 
failure to overcome the statutory presumption of validity to thwart Congress’ purpose of allowing for a 
reexamination procedure to correct examiner errors, without which the presumption of validity never 
would have arisen.”). 
 134. See In re Baxter Intern, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 135. In re Baxter Intern, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 136. See In re Baxter Intern, Inc., 678 F.3d at 1360. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. at 1364–65. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. at 1366–70 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also In re Baxter Intern., Inc., 698 F.3d 
1349, 1351–54 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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decisions, preclusion, and constitutional separation of powers.141  The 
majority, in denying en banc rehearing, largely ignored the concerns of 
the dissent and determined that a court cannot find a patent to be 
“valid”—only “not invalid”—and thus any reexamination determining 
claims of a patent to be invalid does not change the decision of a federal 
court.142 
The Baxter and In re Construction Equipment Co. decisions were 
issued in close proximity and contain valid, rigorous legal arguments for 
both the majorities and dissents.  This shows that the issue is ripe for 
discussion by either the Supreme Court or Congress, and in light of the 
real effects on business parties discussed supra, it would seem such a 
discussion is necessary. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In re Construction Equipment Co. raises many questions concerning 
the constitutional implications of USPTO hearings after civil litigation, 
issue preclusion, and the rights and duties of patent holders and alleged 
infringers.  The legal arguments on both sides are technical and valid; 
however, what must not be forgotten in such cases are the rights of and 
costs to the parties.  After having won its rights to a legal monopoly on a 
new and useful machine nearly a decade earlier, the Federal Circuit 
stripped CEC of this right in favor of a litigant that CEC had previously 
defeated in the courts and in an instant lost its business model it likely 
had planned and operated around for nearly ten years.  Such issues are 
part of the reason that the patent system was viewed as confusing, 
expensive, and needing reform, thus leading to the America Invents Act.  
Even with the America Invents Act, such issues will continue to arise 
and negatively impact the patent system if the rights of and costs to the 
parties are not considered when rendering such decisions.143  While 
Thomas Jefferson viewed patents in some ways as an “embarrassment," 
the system has undoubtedly released secrets to the public that otherwise 
 
 141. See id. at 1366–70 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also In re Baxter Intern., Inc., 698 F.3d 
1349, 1351–54 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 142. See In re Baxter Intern., Inc., 698 F.3d at 1351. 
 143. The new America Invents Act provides new post-grant review procedures.  America Invents 
Act, H.R. 1249, 112th  Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).  However, ex parte reexaminations, the type of 
reexamination initiated by Powerscreen here, remain generally the same.  Matthew C. Phillips & Kevin 
B. Laurence, Changes to Reexamination Under the America Invents Act, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, 
http://www.iptoday.com/issues/2011/11/changes-to-reexamination-under-america-invents-act.asp (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2012) (“The AIA leaves ex parte reexamination largely unchanged.  The most significant 
change is that the new review proceedings will estop ex parte reexamination.  The only other changes 
are fairly minor.  They are (1) elimination of the option to appeal from the Board to district court; (2) 
addition of new statutory language to echo the SNQP standard; and (3) expanded citation of information 
in issued patent files to permit citation of patent owner statements regarding claim scope.”). 
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would remain secret.144  And, if parties are expected to continue to 
utilize the system, there must be some level of finality accorded to 
judicial decisions and the rights of patent holders such that they can 
make rational business decisions. 
  
 
 144. The recipe for Coca-Cola has remained secret as a trade secret for more than 100 years.  
Coca-Cola Moves its Secret Formula to The World of Coca-Cola, COCA-COLA COMPANY, 
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/dynamic/press_center/2011/12/coca-cola-secret-formula-moves-
to-the-world-of-coca-cola.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2012). 
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